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Abstract—1 In this paper, collaborative use of relays to
form a beamforming system and provide physical-layer security
is investigated. In particular, amplify-and-forward (AF) relay
beamforming designs under total and individual relay power
constraints are studied with the goal of maximizing the secrecy
rates when perfect channel state information (CSI) is available.
In the AF scheme, not having analytical solutions for the optimal
beamforming design under both total and individual power
constraints, an iterative algorithm is proposed to numerically
obtain the optimal beamforming structure and maximize the
secrecy rates. Robust beamforming designs in the presence of
imperfect CSI are investigated for decode-and-forward (DF)
based relay beamforming, and optimization frameworks are
provided.
Index Terms: amplify-and-forward relaying, decode-and-
forward relaying, physical-layer security, relay beamforming,
robust beamforming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of wireless transmissions allows for
the signals to be received by all users within the commu-
nication range, making wireless communications vulnerable
to eavesdropping. The problem of secure transmission in
the presence of an eavesdropper was first studied from an
information-theoretic perspective in [1] where Wyner con-
sidered a wiretap channel model. Wyner showed that secure
communication is possible without sharing a secret key if
the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the
main channel, and identified the rate-equivocation region and
established the secrecy capacity of the degraded discrete
memoryless wiretap channel. The secrecy capacity is defined
as the maximum achievable rate from the transmitter to the
legitimate receiver, which can be attained while keeping the
eavesdropper completely ignorant of the transmitted messages.
Later, Wyner’s result was extended to the Gaussian channel in
[3] and recently to fading channels in [4] and [5]. In addition
to the single antenna case, secrecy in multi-antenna models is
addressed in [6] and [7]. Regarding multiuser models, Liu et
al. [8] presented inner and outer bounds on secrecy capacity
regions for broadcast and interference channels. The secrecy
capacity of the multi-antenna broadcast channel is obtained
in [9]. Additionally, it is well known that even if they are
equipped with single-antennas individually, users can cooper-
ate to form a distributed multi-antenna system by performing
1This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant
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relaying. When channel side information (CSI) is exploited,
relay nodes can collaboratively work similarly as in a MIMO
system to build a virtual beam towards the receiver. Relay
beamforming research has attracted much interest recently (see
e.g., [10]–[14] and references therein). Cooperative relaying
under secrecy constraints was also recently studied in [15]–
[18] . In [15], a decode-and-forward (DF) based cooperative
protocol is considered, and a beamforming system is designed
for secrecy capacity maximization or transmit power mini-
mization. For amplify-and-forward (AF), suboptimal closed-
form solutions that optimize bounds on secrecy capacity are
proposed in [16]. However, in those studies, the analysis
is conducted only under total relay power constraints and
perfect CSI. In our recent work[18], we studied the problem
of DF beamforming under both total and individual power
constraints. It is shown that the total power constraint leads
to a closed-form solution. The design under individual relay
power constraints is formulated as an optimization problem
which is shown to be easily solved using two different
approaches, namely semidefinite programming and second-
order cone programming. In this paper, we study amplify-
and-forward (AF) relay beamforming under both total and
individual power constraints. We also extend our previous
study by considering two robust beamforming design methods
for DF relaying under imperfect CSI.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
We consider a communication channel with a source S, a
destination D, an eavesdropper E, and M relays {Rm}Mm=1
as depicted in Figure.1. We assume that there is no direct
link between S and D, and S and E. We also assume that
relays work synchronously by multiplying the signals to be
transmitted with complex weights {wm} to produce a virtual
beam point to destination and eavesdropper. We denote the
channel fading coefficient between S and Rm as gm ∈ C,
the fading coefficient between Rm and D as hm ∈ C, and
the fading coefficient between Rm and E as zm ∈ C. In this
model, the source S tries to transmit confidential messages to
D with the help of the relays while keeping the eavesdropper
E ignorant of the information. It’s obvious that our channel is a
two-hop relay network. In the first hop, the source S transmits
xs to relays with power E[|xs|2] = Ps. The received signal at
Fig. 1. Channel Model
Rm is given by
yr,m = gmxs + ηm (1)
where ηm is the background noise that has a Gaussian dis-
tribution with zero mean and variance of Nm. In first part of
the paper, we focus on amplify-and-forward relaying. Robust
design for DF will be discussed subsequently.
In the AF scenario, the received signal at the mth relay
Rm is directly multiplied by lmwm without decoding, and
forwarded to D. The relay output can be written as
xr,m = wmlm(gmxs + ηm). (2)
The scaling factor,
lm =
1√
|gm|2Ps +Nm
, (3)
is used to ensure E[|xr,m|2] = |wm|2. There are two kinds of
power constraint for relays. First one is a total relay power
constraint in the following form: ||w||2 = w†w ≤ PT where
w = [w1, ...wM ]
T
, PT is the maximum total power for
all relays. (·)T and (·)† denote the transpose and conjugate
transpose, respectively, of a matrix or vector. In a multiuser
network such as the relay system we study in this paper,
it is practically more relevant to consider individual power
constraints as wireless nodes generally operate under such
limitations. Motivated by this, we can impose |wm|2 ≤ pm∀m
or equivalently |w|2 ≤ p where | · |2 denotes the element-wise
norm-square operation and p is a column vector that contains
the components {pm}. pm is the maximum power for the mth
relay node.
The received signals at the destination D and eavesdropper
E are the superposition of the messages sent by the relays.
These received signals are expressed, respectively, as
yd =
M∑
m=1
hmwmlm(gmxs + ηm) + n0, and (4)
ye =
M∑
m=1
zmwmlm(gmxs + ηm) + n1. (5)
where n0 and n1 are the Gaussian background noise compo-
nents at D and E, respectively, with zero mean and variance
N0. Now, it is easy to compute the received SNR at D and E
as
Γd =
|∑Mm=1 hmgmlmwm|2Ps∑M
m=1 |hm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
, and (6)
Γe =
|∑Mm=1 zmgmlmwm|2Ps∑M
m=1 |zm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
. (7)
The secrecy rate is now given by
Rs = I(xs; yd)− I(xs; ye) (8)
= log(1 + Γd)− log(1 + Γe) (9)
= log
(∑M
m=1 |zm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0∑M
m=1 |hm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
×
|∑Mm=1 hmgmlmwm|2Ps +∑Mm=1 |hm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
|∑Mm=1 zmgmlmwm|2Ps +∑Mm=1 |zm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
)
.
(10)
where I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information. In this paper,
we address the joint optimization of {wm} with the aid
perfect CSI and hence identify the optimum collaborative relay
beamforming (CRB) direction that maximizes the secrecy rate
in (10).
III. OPTIMAL BEAMFORMING FOR AF CASE
Let us define
hg = [h
∗
1g
∗
1 l1, ..., h
∗
Mg
∗
M lM ]
T , (11)
hz = [z
∗
1g
∗
1 l1, ..., z
∗
Mg
∗
M lM ]
T , (12)
Dh = Diag(|h1|2l21N1, ..., |hM |2l2MNM ), and (13)
Dz = Diag(|z1|2l21N1, ..., |zM |2l2MNM ). (14)
where superscript ∗ denotes conjugate operation. Then, the
received SNR at the destination and eavesdropper can be
reformulated, respectively, as
Γd =
Psw
†hghg
†w
w†Dhw +N0
=
Pstr(hghg
†ww†)
tr(Dhww†) +N0
, and (15)
Γe =
Psw
†hzhz
†w
w†Dzw+N0
=
Pstr(hzhz
†ww†)
tr(Dzww†) +N0
(16)
where tr(·) represent the trace of a matrix. It is obvious that we
only have to maximize the term inside the logarithm function
in (10). With these notations, we can write the objective
function of the optimization problem as
1 + Γd
1 + Γe
=
1 +
Psw
†hghg
†w
w†Dhw+N0
1 + Psw
†hzhz
†w
w†Dzw+N0
(17)
=
w†Dhw +N0 + Psw†hghg
†w
w†Dzw +N0 + Psw†hzhz
†w
× w
†Dzw +N0
w†Dhw+N0
(18)
=
N0 + tr((Dh + Pshghg
†)ww†)
N0 + tr((Dz + Pshzhz
†)ww†)
× N0 + tr(Dzww
†)
N0 + tr(Dhww†)
.
(19)
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If we denote t1 = N0+tr((Dh+Pshghg
†)ww†)
N0+tr((Dz+Pshzhz†)ww†)
, t2 =
N0+tr(Dzww
†)
N0+tr(Dhww†)
, and define X , ww† using the similar
semidefinite programming method as described in [18], we
can express the optimization problem as
max
X,t1,t2
t1t2
s.t tr (X (Dz − t2Dh)) ≥ N0(t2 − 1)
tr
(
X
(
Dh + Pshghg
† − t1
(
Dz + Pshzhz
†
)))
≥ N0(t1 − 1)
and diag(X) ≤ p, (and/or tr(X) ≤ PT ) and X  0.
(20)
where X  0 means that X is a symmetric positive semi-
definite matrix. Since X by definition is a rank one matrix,
finding the optimal weights is in general a nonconvex opti-
mization problem. Thus, we above ignore the rank constraint,
and hence employ semidefinite relaxation (SDR) [13]. If
the matrix Xopt obtained by solving the above optimization
problem happens to be rank one, then its principal component
will be the optimal solution to the original problem.
Notice that this formulation is applied to both total relay
power constraint and individual relay power constraint which
are represented by tr(X) ≤ PT and diag(X) ≤ p, respec-
tively. When there is only total power constraint, we can easily
compute the maximum values of t1 and t2 separately since
now we have Rayleigh quotient problems.
t1,u = max
w†w≤PT
w†Dhw +N0 + Psw†hghg
†w
w†Dzw +N0 + Psw†hzhz
†w
(21)
= max
w†w≤PT
w†(Dh + N0PT + Pshghg
†)w
w†(Dzw + N0PT + Pshzhz
†)w
(22)
= λmax
(
Dh +
N0
PT
I+ Pshghg
†,Dz +
N0
PT
I+ Pshzhz
†
)
.
(23)
where λmax(A,B) is the largest generalized eigenvalue of the
matrix pair (A,B) 2.
Similarly, maximum values of t2 under total power con-
straint is
t2,u = max
w†w≤PT
w†Dzw+N0
w†Dhw +N0
(24)
= max
w†w≤PT
w†(Dz + N0PT )w
w†(Dh + N0PT )w
(25)
= λmax
(
Dz +
N0
PT
I,Dh +
N0
PT
I
)
. (26)
When there are individual power constraints imposed on the
relays, The maximum values t1,i,u and t2,i,u 3 for t1 and t2
2For a Hermitian matrix A ∈ Cn×n and positive definite matrix B ∈
Cn×n, (λ, ψ) is referred to as a generalized eigenvalue – eigenvector pair of
(A,B) if (λ, ψ) satisfy Aψ = λBψ [19].
3Subscripts i in t1,i,u and t2,i,u are used to denote that these are the
maximum values in the presence of individual power constraints.
is obtained by solving following optimization problem:
max
X,t1
t1
s.t tr
(
X
(
Dh + Pshghg
† − t1
(
Dz + Pshzhz
†
)))
≥ N0(t1 − 1)
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0,
(27)
and
max
X,t2
t2
s.t tr (X (Dz − t2Dh)) ≥ N0(t2 − 1)
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0.
(28)
In fact, for any value of t1, the feasible set in (27) is convex.
If, for any given t1, the convex feasibility problem
find X
s.t tr
(
X
(
Dh + Pshghg
† − t1
(
Dz + Pshzhz
†
)))
≥ N0(t1 − 1)
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0,
(29)
is feasible, then we have t1,i,u ≥ t1. Conversely, if the convex
feasibility optimization problem (29) is not feasible, then we
conclude t1,i,u < t1. Therefore, we can check whether the
optimal value t1,i,u of the quasiconvex optimization problem
in (27) is smaller than or greater than a given value t1 by
solving the convex feasibility problem (29). If the convex
feasibility problem (29) is feasible then we know t1,i,u ≥ t.
If the convex feasibility problem (29) is infeasible, then we
know that t1,i,u < t1. Based on this observation, we can
use a simple bisection algorithm to solve the quasiconvex
optimization problem (27) by solving a convex feasibility
problem (29) at each step. We assume that the problem is
feasible, and start with an interval [l, u] known to contain
the optimal value t1,i,u. We then solve the convex feasibility
problem at its midpoint t1 = (l + u)/2 to determine whether
the optimal value is larger or smaller than t. We update the
interval accordingly to obtain a new interval. That is, if t1
is feasible, then we set l = t1, otherwise, we choose u = t1
and solve the convex feasibility problem again. This procedure
is repeated until the width of the interval is smaller than the
given threshold. Then, we conclude that t1,i,u = l.
Similarly, t2,i,u can be obtained with the same bisection
algorithm by repeatedly solving the following feasibility prob-
lems:
find X
s.t tr (X (Dz − t2Dh)) ≥ N0(t2 − 1)
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0.
(30)
To solve the convex feasibility problem, one can use the
well-studied interior-point based methods as well. We use the
well-developed interior point method based package SeDuMi
[22], which produces a feasibility certificate if the problem is
feasible, and its popular interface Yalmip [23].
Note that for both total and individual power constraints,
the maximum values of t1 and t2 are obtained separately
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above, and these values are in general attained by different
X = ww†. Now, the following strategy can be used to obtain
achievable secrecy rates. For those X values that correspond
to t1,i,u and t1,u (i.e., the maximum t1 values under individual
and total power constraints, respectively), we can compute
the corresponding t2 = N0+tr(Dzww
†)
N0+tr(Dhww†)
and denote them
as t2,i,l and t2,l for individual and total power constraints,
respectively. Then, log(t1,i,ut2,i,l) and log(t1,ut2,l) will serve
as our amplify-and-forward achievable rates for individual and
total power constraints, respectively. With the achievable rates,
we propose the following algorithm to iteratively search over
t1 and t2 to get the optimal t1,o and t2,o that maximize the
product t1t2 by checking the following feasibility problem.
find X  0
s.t tr (X (Dz − t2Dh)) ≥ N0(t2 − 1)
tr
(
X
(
Dh + Pshghg
† − t1
(
Dz + Pshzhz
†
)))
≥ N0(t1 − 1)
and tr(X) ≤ PT if there is total power constraint,
or diag(X) ≤ p if there is individual power constraint.
(31)
A. Proposed Algorithm
Define the resolution ∆t = t1,u
N
or ∆t =
t1,i,u
N
for some
large N for total and individual power constraints, respectively.
1) Initialize t1,o = t1,u , t2,o = t2,l when total power
constraint is imposed, and t1,o = t1,i,u, t2,o = t2,i,l
when individual power constraint is imposed. Initialize
the iteration index i = N .
2) Set t1 = i∆t. If t1t2,u < t1,ot2,o (total power constraint)
or t1t2,i,u < t1,ot2,o (individual power constraint), then
go to Step (3). Otherwise,
a) Let t2 = t1,ot2,ot1 . Check the feasibility problem(31). If it is infeasible, go to step (3). If it is
feasible, use the bisection algorithm in (31) with
t1 to get the maximum possible values of t2 and
denote this maximum as t2,m. The initial interval
in the above bisection algorithm can be chosen as
[
t1,ot2,o
t1
, t2,u] or [
t1,ot2,o
t1
, t2,i,u] depending on the
power constraints.
b) Update t1,o = t1, t2,o = t2,m , i = i− 1. Go back
to step (2).
3) Solve the following convex problem to get the optimal
X
min
X
tr(X)
s.t tr (X (Dz − t2,oDh)) ≥ N0(t2,o − 1)
tr
(
X
(
Dh + Pshghg
† − t1,o
(
Dz + Pshzhz
†
)))
≥ N0(t1,o − 1)
X  0 and
tr(X) ≤ PT if there is total power constraint,
diag(X) ≤ p if there is individual power constraint.
(32)
IV. ROBUST BEAMFORMING DESIGN FOR DF CASE
In the second hop, we can also employ decode and forward
transmission scheme. In this scheme, each relay Rm first
decodes the message xs and normalizes it as x′s = xs/
√
Ps.
Subsequently, the normalized message is multiplied by the
weight factor wm to generate the transmitted signal xr =
wmx
′
s. The output power of each relay Rm is given by
E[|xr |2] = E[|wmx′s|2] = |wm|2. (33)
The received signals at the destination D and eavesdropper
E are the superpositions of the signals transmitted from the
relays. These signals can be expressed, respectively, as
yd =
M∑
m=1
hmwmx
′
s + n0 = h
†wx′s + n0, and (34)
ye =
M∑
m=1
zmwmx
′
s + n1 = z
†wx′s + n1. (35)
Additionally, we have defined h = [h∗1, ....h∗M ]T , z =
[z∗1 , ....z
∗
M ]
T
, The metrics of interest are the received SNR
levels at D and E, which are given by
Γd =
|∑Mm=1 hmwm|2
N0
and Γe =
|∑Mm=1 zmwm|2
N0
. (36)
It has been proved that the secrecy rate Rs over the channel
between the relays and destination is
Rs = I(xs; yd)− I(xs; ye) (37)
= log(1 + Γd)− log(1 + Γe) (38)
= log
(
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 hmwm|2
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 zmwm|2
)
. (39)
By using the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) approach to ap-
proximate the problem as a convex semidefinite programming
(SDP) problem, the beamforming design for decode-and-
forward under perfect CSI with individual power constraint
can be formed as the following optimization problem [18]:
max
X,t
t
s.t tr(X(hh† − tzz†)) ≥ N0(t− 1),
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0.
(40)
which can be solved efficiently by interior point methods with
a bisection algorithm [18].
Systems robust against channel mismatches can be ob-
tained by two approaches. In most of the robust beamforming
methods, the perturbation is modeled as a deterministic one
with bounded norm which leads to a worst case optimization.
The other approach applied to the case in which the CSI
error is unbounded is the statistical approach which provides
the robustness in the form of confidence level measured by
probability.
We define Hˆ = hˆhˆ† and Zˆ = zˆzˆ† as the channel estimators,
and H˜ = H − Hˆ and Z˜ = Z − Zˆ as the estimation errors.
First, consider the worst case optimization. In the worst case
assumption, H˜ and Z˜ are bounded in their Frobenius norm as
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||H˜|| ≤ ǫH , ||Z˜|| ≤ ǫZ , where ǫH , ǫZ are assumed to be upper
bounds on the channel uncertainty. Based on the result of [20],
the robust counterpart of the previously discussed optimization
problem can be written as
max
X,t
t
s.t tr(X((Hˆ− ǫHI)− t(Zˆ+ ǫZI)) ≥ N0(t− 1),
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0.
(41)
Note that the total power constraint tr(X) ≤ PT can be added
into the formulation or substituted for the individual power
constraint in (41). This problem can be solved the same way
as discussed in [18].
However, the worst-case approach requires the norms to be
bounded, which is usually not satisfied in practice. Also, this
approach is too pessimistic since the probability of the worst-
case may be extremely low. Hence, statistical approach is a
good alternative in certain scenarios. In our case, we require
the probability of the non-outage for secrecy transmission is
greater than the predefined threshold ε by imposing
Pr
(
N0 + tr((Hˆ+ H˜)X)
N0 + tr((Zˆ + Z˜)X)
≥ t
)
= Pr
(
tr
(
X(Hˆ+ H˜− t(Zˆ+ Z˜)) ≥ N0(t− 1)
))
≥ ε.
(42)
Now, the optimization problem under imperfect CSI can be
expressed as
max
X,t
t
s.t Pr
(
tr
(
X(Hˆ+ H˜− t(Zˆ+ Z˜)) ≥ N0(t− 1)
))
≥ ε,
and diag(X) ≤ p (or tr(X) ≤ PT ), and X  0.
(43)
If relays are under individual power constraints, we use
diag(X) ≤ p. Otherwise, for the case of total power con-
straint, we use tr(X) ≤ PT . We can also impose both
constraints in the optimization. For simplicity of the analysis
we assume that the components of the Hermitian channel es-
timation error matrices H˜ and Z˜ are independent, zero-mean,
circularly symmetric, complex Gaussian random variables with
variances σ2
H˜
and σ2
Z˜
. Now, we can rearrange the probability
in the constraint as
Pr
(
tr
(
(Hˆ− tZˆ+ H˜− tZ˜)X
)
≥ (t− 1)N0)
)
. (44)
Let us define y = tr
(
(Hˆ− tZˆ+ H˜− tZ˜)X
)
. For given
X, Hˆ, and Zˆ, we know from the results of [21] that y
is a Gaussian distributed random variable with mean µ =
tr
(
(Hˆ− tZˆ)X
)
and variance σ2y = (σ2H˜ + t
2σ2
Z˜
) tr(XX†).
Then, the non-outage probability can be written as
Pr(y ≥ (t− 1)N0) =
∫ ∞
(t−1)N0
1√
2πσy
exp
(
− (y − µ)
2
2σ2y
)
(45)
=
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
(t− 1)N0 − µ√
2σy
)
≥ ε,
(46)
or equivalently as,
(t− 1)N0 − µ√
2σy
≤ erf−1(−2ε+ 1). (47)
Note that ε should be close to one for good performance.
Thus, both −2ε+1 and (t−1)N0−µ√
2σy
should be negative valued.
Note further that we have tr(XX†) = ‖X‖2, and hence σy =√
σ2
H˜
+ t2σ2
Z˜
‖X‖. Then, this constraint can be written as
‖X‖ ≤ (t− 1)N0 − µ√
2(σ2
H˜
+ t2σ2
Z˜
)erf−1(−2ε+ 1)
. (48)
As a result, the optimization problem becomes
max
X,t
t
s.t ||X|| ≤ (t− 1)N0 − µ√
2(σ2
H˜
+ t2σ2
Z˜
)erf−1(−2ε+ 1)
,
and diag(X) ≤ p(or tr(X) ≤ PT ), and X  0.
(49)
Using the same bisection search, we can solve this optimiza-
tion numerically.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We assume that {gm}, {hm}, {zm} are complex, circularly
symmetric Gaussian random variables with zero mean and
variances σ2g , σ2h, and σ2z respectively. Moreover, each figure
is plotted for fixed realizations of the Gaussian channel coeffi-
cients. Hence, the secrecy rates in the plots are instantaneous
secrecy rates
In Fig. 2, we plot the secrecy rate for amplify-and-forward
collaborative relay beamforming system for both individual
and total power constraints. We also provide the result of
suboptimal achievable secrecy rate for comparison. The fixed
parameters are σg = 10, σh = 2, σz = 2, Nm = 1,N0 = 1 and
M = 10. Since the AF secrecy rates depend on both the source
and relay powers, the rate curves are plotted as a function of
PT /Ps. We assume that the relays have equal powers in the
case in which individual power constraints are imposed, i.e.,
pi = PT /M . It is immediately seen from the figure that the
achievable rates for both total and individual power constraints
are very close to the corresponding optimal ones. Thus, the
achievable beamforming scheme is a good alternative in the
amplify-and-forward relaying case due to the fact that it has
much less computational burden. Moreover, we interestingly
observe that imposing individual relay power constraints leads
to only small losses in the secrecy rates with respect to the
case in which we have total relay power constraints.
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Fig. 3. DF second secrecy rate vs. PT under different ε.
In Fig. 3, we plot the maximum second hop secrecy rate of
decode-and-forward that we can achieve for different power
PT and non-outage probability ε values. In this simulation,
we fix M = 5. hˆ and zˆ are randomly picked from Rayleigh
fading with σ
hˆ
= 1 and σzˆ = 2, and we assume that estimation
errors are inversely proportional to PT . More specifically, in
our simulation, we have σ2
H˜
= 0.1/PT and σ2Z˜ = 0.2/PT . We
also assume the relays are operating under equal individual
power constraints, i.e., pi = PTM . It is immediately observed in
Fig. 3 that smaller rates are supported under higher non-outage
probability requirements. In particular, this figure illustrates
that our formulation and the proposed optimization framework
can be used to determine how much secrecy rate can be
supported at what percentage of the time. For instance, at
PT = 100, we see that approximately 7 bits/symbol secrecy
rate can be attained 70 percent of the time (i.e., ε = 0.7)
while supported secrecy rate drops to about 5.8 bits/symbol
when ε = 0.95.
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